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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from a final Order (Summary Judgment) of 
the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
(Honorable Ronald E. Nehring). Linda Ilott, the plaintiff-
appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j). The Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), "'poured"' 
this Appeal "over" to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented by this Appeal is the following: 
whether the District Court committed reversible error when it 
determined, in the face of the facts and procedural history of 
this case, that this is, by its nature and despite Ms. Ilott's 
never pursuing such a theory, a "failure-to-inspect" or 
"inadequate or negligent inspection" case, and only such a 
case, and that the University of Utah is thus immune, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(4), from suit by Ms. Ilott. 
(STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
Summary Judgment should be affirmed only if there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact and only if the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellate 
court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for 
1 
correctness. E.g., Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 
(Utah 1993). The appellate court does not defer to the trial 
court's ruling on appeal of a grant of summary judgment. 
E.g., Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 
App. 1993). On review of a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Id. 
(ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT) 
This issue was preserved in the District Court by 
Ms. Ilott's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. at 101-83) and at oral argument, 
presented May 18, 1999, in opposition to that Motion. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
This Appeal, in this personal injury lawsuit, is from a 
summary judgment that was entered pursuant to the District 
Court's determination that this case arises from a failure to 
make an inspection or the making of an inadequate or negligent 
inspection and that the University of Utah (the defendant-
appellee) is, thus, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(4), 
immune from suit by Ms. Ilott. 
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Ms. Ilott alleged, in her Complaint (R. at 1-11), that 
the University negligently breached its duty to Ms. Ilott, a 
paying customer and business invitee who was attending a 
football game at the University's football stadium on 
October 29, 1994, by, among other things, failing to make and 
keep the subject property safe, non-dangerous, and non-
defective, and that Ms. Ilott sustained substantial 
compensable damages, special and general, by reason of that 
negligence. Ms. Ilott did not allege or pursue a claim that 
the University had negligently failed to inspect or had 
negligently or inadequately inspected the subject premises. 
The University filed a motion for summary judgment and 
supporting memorandum (R. at 35-81), contending that the 
subject condition (a rotten or otherwise worn-out bleacher 
plank that broke under Ms. Ilott's weight) constituted a non-
actionable latent defect and, alternatively, that, by its 
nature, this was a "failure to inspect" or "negligent or 
inadequate inspection" case. 
That motion was vigorously contested by Ms. Ilott, in her 
memorandum in opposition (R. at 101-83) and during oral 
argument. The District Court took the matter under advisement 
and ultimately determined, in its Memorandum Decision (R. at 
210-20; copy appearing in Addendum), that this case is, by its 
3 
nature, a negligent or inadequate inspection or failure-to-
inspect case and that the University is thus immune from suit 
by Ms. Ilott. The District Court on August 23, 1999 entered 
its formal Order (R. at 221-22) granting the University's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Ilott's Notice of Appeal (R. 
at 223-24) was filed September 2, 1999. 
On or about October 1, 1999, Ms. Ilott filed, pursuant to 
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, her Motion 
for Summary Disposition (reversal, on the basis of manifest 
error). The Utah Supreme Court, by its Order dated 
October 20, 1999, deferred ruling on that motion until further 
consideration. 
By its Order (R. at 231) dated December 1, 1999, the Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this Appeal to this Court. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Ilott stepped on a worn-out plank that, along with 
two other planks, comprised a bleacher seat at the University 
of Utah football stadium. The plank broke under her weight 
and she sustained significant knee and other leg injuries in 
the incident. R. at 2-3. 
The University had knowledge of the general problem (old 
wooden bleachers rotting and deteriorating, over time, to the 
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point of failure). E.g., Deposition of Mark Jolly, at 27 (R. 
at 157); Deposition of Elwin John, at 21 (R. at 177). 
The wood used for the bleachers is untreated, and 
University crew member employees acknowledged that breakage 
was due to rot in the wood and/or normal wear and tear. Jolly 
depo., at 27 (R. at 157); John depo., at 21 (R. at 177). 
The bleachers broke or otherwise needed to be replaced in 
all areas of the stadium. The University's Gary Ratliff 
testified, "x[w]e saw no pattern. No rhyme or reason for where 
the planks broke or anything." Deposition of Gary Ratliff, at 
39 (R. at 137). 
The University came forward with no evidence to suggest 
that any of the metal bleachers in place at the stadium had 
ever broken, and the only University employees (the people who 
did the stadium bleacher inspection and replacement work) 
asked about that subject denied knowledge of any such problems 
with any metal bleachers. E.g., John depo., at 21 (R. at 
177). Not as a "post-incident remedial measure," but in 
conjunction with and as part of the stadium's overall 
renovation, the stadium now has all metal bleachers. E.g., 
Deposition of Steve Pyne at 21 (R. at 124). 
Every year, at the beginning of each season, University 
employees would walk the bleachers and look at the bleachers 
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and determine, by visual observation and weight testing, which 
bleachers or parts thereof needed to be replaced. E.g., Aff. 
of Gary Ratliff, para. 1 (R. at 83). Many wooden planks were 
replaced at the beginning of every reason. E.g., Jolly depo. 
at 21-22 (R. at 156). So many bad planks were found that 
contests were held, on a daily basis, and the University 
employee who broke the fewest planks by walking on them had to 
buy pizza for his bleacher-busting colleagues. Depo. of Gary 
Ratliff, 37-38 (R. at 135-36). 
It is a common occurrence for spectators at games or 
other events to walk on the wooden bleachers at the stadium. 
The University's Jeffery Thomas testified: 
QUESTION: Have you seen people during football games walk 
on bleachers, wooden bleachers? 
ANSWER: Yes, I have. 
QUESTION: Is that something that you've seen every time, 
every game? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
QUESTION: People by the numbers doing that? 
ANSWER: What's that, again? 
QUESTION: Lots of people doing that? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
Thomas depo,., at 22 (R. at 153). See, also, deposition of 
Clifford Garland, at 28 (R. at 172). 
Despite the knowledge that spectators routinely, and as a 
matter of course, walked on the old wooden bleachers, the 
University did not warn spectators of the risks of walking on 
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the bleachers, by announcement, by signs, or otherwise. 
Mr. Thomas testified as follows: 
QUESTION: Have you ever seen any signs up at the football 
stadium telling people not to do that [walk on 
bleachers]? 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION: Have you ever heard anything over the 
loudspeaker at football games telling people 
not to do that? 
ANSWER: No. 
Thomas depo., at 22 (R. at 153). See, also, John depo., at 
22-23 (R. at 178-79). 
The University does warn spectators not to walk on the 
seats in events in the Huntsman Center (another University 
facility, one used for basketball games) due to concerns that 
the seats might break. John depo., at 23 (R. at 179). 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The primary focus of Ms. Ilott's claim has been and 
remains that the University breached its duty of care to 
Ms. Ilott by failing to keep the subject premises reasonably 
safe, by allowing the subject premises to be unreasonably 
unsafe, dangerous, and defective, and by, among other things, 
allowing bleacher seats, one of which gave way under 
Ms. Ilott's weight, to be and remain in a rotted or otherwise 
deteriorating condition. The contentions advanced by 
Ms. Ilott have primarily to do with the proposition that, as 
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results of the University's knowledge of the generally 
deteriorating condition of the bleachers, replacing numerous 
of the old and -- by age and weathering -- deteriorated planks 
on only an ad hoc basis was an unsatisfactory and negligent 
response. 
The University convinced the District Court that this 
case dealt with something it did not -- a contention that the 
inspections themselves were inadequate or negligent. It has 
never been the inspections or the inspection process of which 
Ms. Ilott has complained but, rather, the University's failure 
physically to address the general condition (as it now has, 
subsequent to the subject incident, by installing metal 
bleachers throughout the stadium) and/or satisfactorily to 
warn people not to walk on the old wooden bleacher seats. 
This Court should recognize and act on the general 
proposition of law that parties ought to be allowed to pursue 
claims of their choosing and not have them contorted into 
something they are not. This Court should reverse the 
District Court's characterization of Ms. Ilott's claims as 
"failure to inspect or inadequate or negligent inspection" and 
its concomitant granting, on governmental immunity grounds, of 
the University's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. MS. ILOTT'S INJURIES ARISE OUT OF "A DANGEROUS OR 
DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF ANY PUBLIC BUILDING, STRUCTURE ... 
OR OTHER PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT'7 AND NOT OUT OF A FAILURE TO 
MAKE AN INSPECTION OR THE MAKING OF AN INADEQUATE OR 
NEGLIGENT INSPECTION." 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9 provides: 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in §63-30-10, immunity 
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any 
injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of 
any public building, structure ... or other public 
improvement. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 provides, in pertinent part: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(4) A failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
As Ms. Ilott sought to explain to the District Court, and 
as is clear from her Complaint, she has never advanced a claim 
of failure-to-inspect or of negligent or inadequate 
inspection. The essential paragraphs of her Complaint (R. at 
1-11) are, for purposes pertinent hereto, the following: 
4. On October 29, 1994, and continuously, for a 
substantial period of time prior thereto, defendant 
owned, leased, possessed, and/or controlled, and had 
the duty to maintain and keep safe, non-dangerous, 
and non-defective certain real property ("the 
subject premises") located, on information and 
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belief, on the University of Utah campus and 
commonly known as the University of Utah Stadium and 
Rice Stadium. 
5. On October 29, 1994, plaintiff was an invitee of 
defendant and was a person to whom defendant owed 
the duty of reasonable care, including the duty to 
keep the subject premises safe and well-maintained 
and not dangerous, defective, or unsafe. 
6. Defendant, on and prior to October 29, 1994, by and 
through one or more of its agents, breached its duty 
of care to plaintiff by failing to keep the subject 
premises safe, by allowing the subject premises to 
be unsafe, dangerous, and defective, and by, among 
other things,1 and with actual or constructive notice 
of that condition, allowing a "bleacher" seat to be 
and remain in a rotted or otherwise deteriorated 
condition. 
A review of that language and the entirety of the 
Complaint will make it clear that Ms. Ilott's claim fits the 
§63-30-9 "dangerous or defective condition" concept and has 
nothing to do with a supposedly inadequate or negligent 
inspection. The fact that the University, through its 
employees, inspected the bleacher seats does not detract from 
the accuracy of the proposition that this is not an inspection 
case. 
If the mere fact that a governmental entity has conducted 
an inspection of its own unsafe property could, ipso facto, 
1
 Ms Ilott also contends that the University's duty of care included the 
duty to warn her and the other patrons of the stadium of the danger 
inherent in walking on the old wooden bleachers, and that the University 
abjectly breached that aspect of its duty of care 
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turn every tort case claiming that government property is 
defective or dangerous into a negligent inspection case, 
virtually no claim, regardless of its strength, regarding a 
dangerous or defective condition of a public building or other 
public improvement or, for that matter, of a public highway, 
tunnel, bridge, etc. (see Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9) could hope 
to succeed. For, to one degree or another, and with varying 
degrees of frequency, all such things are "inspected." 
Ms. Ilott urges the Court to recognize that it cannot, in 
light of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 and §63-30-9, be the law of 
Utah that a person who is injured by reason of a dangerous 
public building or highway can be checkmated in her effort to 
obtain compensation by the governmental entity's simply making 
the argument that the plaintiff s claim is necessarily one of 
negligent inspection. Otherwise, and by reason of the fact 
that governmental entities always conduct some manner of 
"inspection" of their own properties, the presumptive waiver 
of immunity that is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-8 and 
63-30-9 would be rendered essentially meaningless. And, as 
numerous Utah appellate decisions have explained, related 
statutes such as those comprising the Utah governmental 
immunity act need to be construed in a fashion that harmonizes 
the statutes and renders none meaningless. E.g., Lyon v. 
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Burton, 2000 Utah 19, 1 17; Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 
644 (Utah 1993). 
The Court should determine that this case is not a 
negligent inspection case and should reverse the District 
Court's ruling. 
B. SECTION 63-30-10(4) "APPLIES ONLY TO CONCLUSIONS AND 
RESULTS OF AN INSPECTION WHERE THE INSPECTOR MAY HAVE 
OVERLOOKED SOMETHING OR MADE A FAULTY JUDGMENT IN 
DECIDING WHETHER TO APPROVE OR REJECT THE SUBJECT OF THE 
INSPECTION." 
In Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 
1993), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Salt Lake 
City's motion for summary judgment and a judgment on a jury 
verdict for an employee of a contractor that was doing work 
for Salt Lake City at the Salt Lake City International 
Airport. That person was injured when an employee of the 
City, while in the course of his job duties, as a construction 
inspector, inspecting the contractor's work, negligently 
pushed a button that activated a large garage-type overhead 
door against which the plaintiff's ladder was leaning. The 
opening of the door caused the ladder and the plaintiff to 
fall and caused the plaintiff to sustain injuries. The City 
contended that it was immune, under the governmental immunity 
"inspection" statute (then codified at Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
12 
10(1) (d), contending that its employee's negligent conduct 
occurred 
at the very core of the inspection process in that (1) he 
was attempting to raise a door to make a more thorough 
inspection, and (2) it was not an incidental act which 
happened to occur during the course of the inspection, 
unrelated to the inspection itself. 
Id. at 997. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the City's 
employee was acting "as an inspector for the City as the owner 
of the property and as a party to the construction project" 
{id.) but stated: 
We believe that the legislation intended to preserve a 
narrow immunity for inspections to allow inspectors to 
perform their work without fear that an oversight which 
later causes injury would give rise to liability on the 
part of the governmental entity. The conclusions and 
results of the inspection are not to be second-guessed by 
courts and juries. 
Id. at 998 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court then held, in 
part, as follows: 
We ... conclude that the immunity granted in section 63-30-
10(1)(d) was intended to immunize only the conclusions 
and results of an inspection where the inspector may have 
overlooked something or made a faulty judgment in 
deciding whether to approve or reject the subject of the 
inspection. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
There is nothing in the record of this case to support 
the proposition that the University employees were 
professional inspectors or the proposition that Ms. Ilott 
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contends that any of them erred "in deciding whether to 
approve or reject the subject of the inspection." The workers 
in question were maintenance and repair workers and not 
inspection professionals. E.g., deposition of crew leader 
Mark Coburn at 9-10 (R. at 160-61). 
The instant case is somewhat analogous to Nixon v. Salt 
Lake City Corporation, 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995), a case in 
which, among other things, the Supreme Court rejected the 
City's argument that its "failure to maintain floor scrubbers 
[owned by the City] was, at least in part, attributable to 
inadequate or negligent inspection as that term is used in 
section 63-30-10(4)." Id. at 270. Even in the face of the 
fact that "for some period prior to Nixon's injuries, the SLC 
employees failed to open the battery cells daily to check the 
fluid level in the batteries and failed to test the battery 
fluid on a regular schedule with a hydrometer" (id. at 267), 
the Supreme Court held that "as a matter of law, the acts 
complained of are acts of maintenance rather than acts of 
inspection." Id. at 570 (emphasis added). The unanimous 
Nixon court then, id., favorably quoted from Ericksen, 858 
P.2d at 997: 
[T]he question of whether a governmental entity is liable 
for the negligent inspection of property most frequently 
arises when the entity undertakes inspections to assure 
14 
compliance with building, fire, electric and other safety 
codes. 
It is, of course, manifest that nothing of this sort was going 
on in connection with the subject work done and not done on 
the University's own property. 
Just as in Nixon the Supreme Court appropriately focused 
on the negligent maintenance of the machines in question and 
refused to buy into Salt Lake City's stretch of an argument 
that what went on there was a negligent "inspection" 
(something apparently not alleged or pursued by Mr. Nixon), 
this Court should recognize that the essence of the fault of 
the University in this case has nothing to do with the 
"inspection" process, per se, but is its negligent failure 
satisfactorily to maintain and repair the bleachers or to 
address the overall deteriorated condition of the old wooden 
bleachers by wholesale replacement. This Court should, 
accordingly, reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
C. THE DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE OWED BY THE UNIVERSITY TO 
MS. ILOTT INCLUDED THE DUTY TO WARN, AND THAT DUTY EXISTS 
APART FROM "INSPECTION" ANALYSIS. 
A pertinent Utah case, given the big picture of this case 
and the duty of the University to keep its premises reasonably 
safe for business invitees such as Ms. Ilott, and satis-
15 
factorily to warn them2 of dangers attending the use of parts 
of its premises, is Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 
31, 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951). The plaintiff's primary 
contention in Erickson was that the premises owner 
knew or should have known of the propensities of the 
floor to become slippery when wet and was negligent in 
failing to warn customers using the entrance way of the 
hazard involved or to obviate the slippery condition .... 
232 P.2d at 211. 
The Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Erickson includes 
its instructive and favorable discussion of a jury instruction 
given in that case: 
With respect to the duty upon [the defendant], the jury 
was instructed that ... 'it was the duty of [the defendant] 
to exercise reasonable care to keep the entranceway to 
its store reasonably safe for the use of its customers; 
and in this regard you are instructed that if you shall 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
entranceway was not reasonably safe in that the floor of 
the entranceway had become we from rainwater and slick 
and slippery and that [the defendant] knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known of said 
condition, 
remedy said 
reasonably 
warning sig 
covering th 
substances 
and failed 
. condition 
to exercise reasonable care to 
and make 
safe for the use of 
ns to advise of the 
e terrazzo 
to prevent 
entrance 
slipping, 
said entranceway 
its customers, by means 
slick condition or by 
with rubber mats or oth< 
of 
sr 
. then [the defendant] was 
negligent.' 
Id. at 212-14 (emphasis added) 
2
 Please note that there is, unlike the "negligent inspection" provision, 
no even arguable governmental immunity defense on which the University can 
rely for its failure to warn Ms. Ilott. 
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No development in Utah law since the Erickson case was 
decided has detracted from the accuracy of that instruction. 
No Utah case vitiates the duty to make safe and/or warn, even 
if it is somehow determined that "inspection" analysis is 
applicable. It is nearly indisputable, on the record of this 
case, that the premises were not safe and it is entirety 
indisputable that the University gave no warning. 
University employees understood the risk that persons 
walking or running on the bleachers might break the bleachers 
and injure themselves (Ratliff depo., at 57 (R. at 142)), but 
the University did nothing, by any warnings or by systemically 
physically addressing this problem, to address that reality. 
Even in the face of the University's knowledge that the 
wooden planks would often break when walked upon (e.g., Thomas 
depo. at 15 (R. at 152); John depo. at 28-29 (R. at 182-83)), 
that they could break when spectators or athletes walked or 
ran on them, and that at every game spectators walked on the 
bleachers (Thomas depo. at 22 (R. at 153)), the University did 
not warn spectators to refrain from walking on the bleachers 
{id.; see, also, John depo. at 22-23 (R. at 178-79)). 
This Court should recognize, whatever it does with the 
"inspection" versus maintenance/repair/replacement aspect of 
this Appeal, that Ms. Ilott's injuries "arise," at least in 
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part, "out of" the University's failure to warn her of the 
danger of which the University knew, at least as a matter of 
triable fact, to be present in its stadium. The Court should, 
accordingly, reverse the District Court's granting of summary 
judgment. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Utah Supreme Court long ago, in Glenn v. Gibbons & 
Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1954), restated 
the general common law rule that a premises owner owes a 
business visitor the duty to keep its premises in a condition 
that is reasonably safe for the business visitor. This Court 
should keep in mind, as it analyzes the specifics of this 
case, the University's general duty to act reasonably to make 
and keep its premises safe for Ms. Ilott. As with nearly all 
negligence cases, the question of whether the University 
breached its duty to act reasonably is a question of fact to 
be resolved, based upon the totality of the circumstances. 
A central question for jury determination in this case 
will be, unless the District Court on remand grants Ms. Ilott 
a directed verdict on the question, whether the condition of 
the bleachers in the stadium was such that an unreasonable 
risk of harm was present. The Utah Court of Appeals, in the 
premises liability case of Wagoner v. Waterslide, Inc., 744 
18 
P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1987), addressed that question. In 
Wagoner, the Court held: 
The initial issue is whether or not the condition of the 
water slide presented an unreasonable risk of harm to 
defendant's patrons. Whether an unreasonable risk of 
harm existed is a determination of fact to be made by the 
jury. AThe standard upon which negligence is gauged is 
that of ordinary, reasonable care under the 
circumstances, which standard it is peculiarly fitting 
that juries determine.' DeWeese v. J.C. Penney, Co., 5 
Utah 2d 116, 119, 297 P.2d 898, 901 (1956). 
744 P.2d at 1013. 
It appears, as suggested hereinabove, that, if the 
District Court's analysis is correct, any time a piece of 
property owned by a governmental entity is defective or 
dangerous and any time there has ever been any "inspection" of 
that property by the governmental entity itself, or, indeed, a 
total failure of the governmental entity ever to "inspect" the 
property, an injured person such as Ms. Ilott will never be 
allowed to recover, regardless of the abysmal nature of the 
condition, regardless of the abject lack of warnings, and 
regardless of how the case is pleaded and developed in 
discovery. Ms. Ilott urges the Court to recognize that that 
would be bad public policy, would render Utah Code Ann. §§63-
30-8 and 63-30-9 essentially meaningless, and cannot be the 
law. 
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Ms. Ilott urges the Court to reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment and to remand this case for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 2000. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
TARA L. ISAACSON 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA ILOTT, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 960906196 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
This case came before me for hearing on defendant University 
of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18, 1999. I then took 
the matter under advisement. Since then, I have examined the legal 
authorities cited by counsel in support of their respective 
positions and considered counsels' oral argument. For the reasons 
stated below, I grant defendant's motion based on my conclusion 
that the conduct of the defendant claimed to be actionable arose 
from an inspection for which the University, as a governmental 
entity, is immune from suit. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
0001 
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The plaintiff alleges that on October 29, 1994, she attended 
a football game at Rice Stadium, a facility owned by the defendant. 
The plaintiff was returning to her seat when one of the planks used 
as bleacher seats in the north end-zone collapsed as she stepped on 
it, injuring her. 
In support of their Motion, the University presents the 
Affidavit of Gary Ratliff, who notes that u[e]ach summer before 
s 
football season begins, the University does a visual and weight 
inspection of all of the bleachers and seats in the Rice Stadium." 
(Affidavit of Gary Ratliff at para. 1). The plaintiff contests 
Mr. Ratliff's assertion that each of the three planks of every 
bleacher was visually or weight inspected by citing to the 
deposition testimony of Steven Pyne that he did not have specific 
recollection of conducting any inspections and repairs immediately 
prior to the October 29, 1994, football game. (Deposition of Steven 
Pyne at pp. 32-33). Mr. Pyne's deposition testimony creates an 
issue of fact concerning the scope of the defendant's inspection, 
but it is an issue which is rendered immaterial by Utah Code 
Annotated §63-30-10(4). 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The defendant contends that the governmental immunity 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §63-30-10(4) and (17) bar the 
plaintiff's lawsuit. Section 63-30-10(4) provides as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope ^ of 
employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection. 
The defendant asserts if its inspection should have disclosed a 
defective bleacher, then it is immune under subsection 4 because 
the plaintiff's injuries arose out of its "failure to make an 
inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection." 
In response to the defendant's immunity argument, the 
plaintiff suggests, unfortunately without discussion or analysis, 
that paragraph (4) does not apply because her claims do not involve 
a failure to inspect or negligent inspection. After reviewing the 
plaintiff's Complaint and the record developed pursuant to the 
ftiim 
ILOTT V. U OF U PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
University's Motion, I am persuaded when the plaintiff's claim that 
the University breached its duty to keep Rice Stadium safe and 
well-maintained is coupled with the undisputed fact that the 
University conducted regular inspections of the bleacher planks, 
inspection immunity bars plaintiff's suit as a matter of law. 
The plaintiff herself supplies the primary impetus for my 
determination that her claims are subject to inspection immunity in 
her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Memorandum"). The legal authority cited by plaintiff as 
"most instructive with respect to the issues before this Court" is 
quoted with emphasis for the proposition that " [The defendant] was 
in the actual possession of the building and had a duty to search 
out defects in the premises in order that they be reasonably safe 
for the presence of business visitors." Memorandum, at 9,10, citing 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. , 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951) . The 
inspections of the bleachers conducted by the University were 
undertaken in clear recognition of the duty articulated in 
Erickson. Since the weakened condition of the plank that failed 
beneath Ms. Ilott was not apparent, she could only establish the 
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University's negligence by proving that a reasonable inspection 
would have revealed its true condition. Accordingly, the crux of 
the plaintiff's case is in fact premised on the defendant's 
negligent or inadequate inspection. 
Having determined that the plaintiff's claims are based on the 
theory of negligent inspection, I turn to the question of whether 
the defendant's inspection of the bleachers falls within the ambit 
of immunity granted under paragraph (4). The Utah Supreme Court 
has addressed the scope of paragraph (4) in two cases: Ericksen v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), and Nixon v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). Each of these cases 
pares back the application of inspection immunity in different 
ways. 
In Ericksen, the court decided whether immunity should be 
granted when the negligent conduct complained of occurred 
incidental to the actual inspection. The court indicated that 
u[t]he question of whether a governmental entity is liable for the 
negligent inspection of property most frequently arises when the 
entity undertakes inspections to assure compliance with building, 
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fire, electric and other safety codes." Id. at 997 (citing 57A 
Am.Jur.2d Negligence §376 (1989)). The court also noted its belief 
that "the legislature intended to preserve a narrow immunity for 
inspections to allow inspectors to perform their work without, fear 
that an oversight which later causes injury would give rise to 
liability on the part of a governmental entity." Id. at 998. The 
court held that immunity related to negligent inspection "was 
intended to immunize only the conclusions and results of an 
inspection whe>re the inspector may have overlooked something or 
made a faulty judgment in deciding whether to approve or reject the 
subject of the inspection." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, under 
Ericksen, the first component of immunity for negligent inspection 
is that inspectors who conduct themselves negligently while making 
an inspection are not immunized - the Ericksen inspector 
negligently opened the wrong overhead door while conducting the 
inspection of a building under construction dislodging a ladder 
which was plciced against the door and injuring the worker who 
occupied it - while inspectors that reach incorrect conclusions 
and results from an inspection enjoy immunity. 
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In Nixon, court restricted the reach of inspection immunity 
by denominating the failure to identify and repair faulty cleaning 
equipment as a shortcoming in maintenance and not inspection. The 
court determined that this was not a case "where an inspector 
failed to determine that a particular building or piece of 
equipment was unsafe for the public as whole." Id. at 269. In 
reaching this decision, the court discussed the genesis of immunity 
for negligent inspection as being the "public duty doctrine" which 
"'operates to disallow recovery by individuals for such inspections 
on the ground that the [inspection] was intended to protect the 
general public, and^to provide a means of enforcing a third-party's 
duty to repair defects, rather than to protect a particular 
individual or class of individuals. '" Id. (citing 57A Am. Jur. 2d 
Negligence §376) (Emphasis added). Therefore, while the Ericksen 
court reiterated its view that the inspection immunity is to be 
parceled out parsimoniously, it is properly invoked where the 
inspection is undertaken to safeguard the general public. 
Various rationales for the public duty doctrine exist. 
Foremost among them is the notion that the governments interest in 
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safeguarding the public interest predominates over the interests of 
any one individual. The Utah Supreme Court in Gillman v. 
Department of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506, 513 (Utah 
1989) , discussed the reasoning behind the public duty doctrine in 
the context of immunity granted in connection with the issuance, 
denial, suspension, or revocation of licenses. The court quoted 4 
California Law Revision Comm'n, Reports, Recommendations and 
Studies 817-18 (1963) : 
"
xPublic entities and public employees should not be 
liable for failure to make arrests or otherwise to 
enforce any law. They should not be liable for failing to 
inspect persons or property adequately to determine 
compliance with health and safety regulations. Nor should 
they be liable for negligent or wrongful issuance or 
revocation of licenses and permits. The government has 
undertaken these activities to insure public health and 
safety. To provide the utmost public protection, 
governmental entities should not be dissuaded from 
engaging in such activities by the fear that liability 
may be imposed if an employee performs his duties 
inadequately. Moreover, if liability existed for this 
type of activity, the risk exposure to which a public 
entity would be subject would include virtually all 
activities going on within the community. There would be 
potential governmental liability for all building 
defects, for all crimes, and for all outbreaks of 
contagious disease. No private person is subjected to 
risks of this magnitude.... Far more persons would suffer 
if government did not perform these functions at all than 
would be benefitted by permitting recovery in those cases 
r.fii>R 
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where the government is shown to have performed 
inadequately. ' " 
Id. at 513. 
Pursuant to the analytical model established in Ericksen and 
Nixon, I conclude that the defendant has established both 
components of immunity for inspection. First, the plaintiff's 
injuries stem from the incorrect conclusion reached by the 
individuals who inspected the bleachers that all of the bleachers 
were safe for the public using Rice Stadium. In other words, the 
plaintiff's injuries resulted directly from an alleged oversight 
related to the actual inspection process. The second component of 
public duty is also met because the University's inspectors 
allegedly failed to determine that at least one of the bleachers, 
which collapsed when the plaintiff stood on it, was unsafe for 
public use. It is evident that the inspection of the bleachers was 
undertaken to insure public health and safety. Since the 
plaintiff's injuries arose as a result of incorrect conclusions and 
results of an inspection which was undertaken for the public in 
general, the exception to the waiver of immunity found in §63-30-
10(4) applies to bar the plaintiff's action. 
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Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this / f day of July, 1999. 
3^ 
RONALD E.^NEHRING U 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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